Stephen Quackenbush

Director of MA in Defense and Strategic Studies, Associate Professor
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Stephen L. Quackenbush is Associate Professor and Director of Defense and Strategic Studies in the Truman School of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Missouri. His research and teaching focuses on international conflict, deterrence, and strategic studies, with current research projects on bridging the academic-policy divide, gray zone deterrence, and geography and counterinsurgency. He is the author of Understanding General Deterrence: Theory and Application (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), International Conflict: Logic and Evidence (CQ Press, 2015), and numerous journal articles and book chapters. Quackenbush created the MA in Defense and Strategic Studies at Mizzou and is a former president of the International Studies Association-Midwest. He received his BS from Illinois Institute of Technology and his MS from Georgia Tech, both in Aerospace Engineering, and his MA and PhD in Political Science from the University at Buffalo, SUNY. He served as an officer in the US Army, earning a Bronze Star during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Publications

Books

International Conflict: Logic and Evidence. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2015.

Understanding General Deterrence: Theory and Application. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Articles and Book Chapters

“Deterrence.” In Elgar Encyclopedia of International Relations, ed. Beate Jahn and Sebastian Schindler, forthcoming. e ed. Beate Jahn and Sebastian Schindler, forthcoming.

“The Problem with Accidental War,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 40(6): 675-691, 2023.

“Initiative and Military Effectiveness: Evidence from the Yom Kippur War” [with Ryan Grauer]. Journal of Global Security Studies 6(2), 2021.

“Outcomes and Consequences of War.” In What Do We Know About War?, Third edition, ed. Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and John A. Vasquez. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021.

“Extended Deterrence of North Korea: A Three-party Game.” In Game Theory and Nuclear Stability in Northeast Asia, ed. Lauren Ice, James Scouras, Kelly Rooker, Robert Leonhard, and David McGarvey. Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2019.

“Empirical Analyses of Deterrence.” In Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory, ed. William Thompson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

“Use of Force in Foreign Policy” [with Thomas Guarrieri]. In Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Cameron Thies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

“Centers of Gravity and War Outcomes.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 33(4): 361-380, 2016.

“Modern Deterrence Theory: Research Trends, Policy Debates, and Methodological Controversies” [with Frank Zagare]. In Oxford Handbooks Online, ed. Desmond King. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

“We Always Fight the Last War? Prior Experiences in Counterinsurgency and Conventional Warfare and War Outcomes” [with Amanda Murdie]. International Interactions 41(1): 183-200, 2015.

“The Durability of International Conflict Settlements.” In Oxford Bibliographies in International Relations, ed. David Armstrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

“Game Theory and Interstate Conflict.” In Oxford Bibliographies in International Relations, ed. David Armstrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

“National Missile Defense and (Dis)Satisfaction” [with A. Cooper Drury]. Journal of Peace Research 48(4): 469-480, 2011.

“Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?” Review of International Studies 37(2): 741-762, 2011.

“Not All Peace Years are Created Equal: Trade, Imposed Settlements, and Recurrent Conflict” [with Timothy M. Peterson]. International Interactions 36(4): 363-383, 2010.

“Territorial Issues and Recurrent Conflict.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 27(3): 239-252, 2010.

“General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory.” International Interactions 36(1): 60-85, 2010.

“Evaluating the Monadic Democratic Peace” [with Michael Rudy]. Conflict Management and Peace Science 26(3): 268-285, 2009.

“Settlements, Outcomes, and the Recurrence of Conflict” [with Jerome F. Venteicher]. Journal of Peace Research 45(6): 723-742, 2008.

“National Missile Defense and Deterrence.” Political Research Quarterly 59(4): 533-541, 2006.

“Not only Whether but Whom: Three-party Extended Deterrence.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(4): 562-583, 2006.

“Identifying Opportunity for Conflict: Politically Active Dyads.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 23(1): 37-51, 2006.

“Game Theory: Modeling Interstate Conflict” [with Frank C. Zagare]. In Making Sense of International Relations Theory, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 98-114, 2006.

“The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory.” International Interactions 30(2): 87-107, 2004.

“Sowing the Seeds of Conflict: The Effect of Dispute Settlements on Durations of Peace” [with Paul D. Senese]. Journal of Politics 65(3): 696-7

 

Stephen
International Relations
Research Methods